本文对让·布立丹提出的解决虚拟骗子悖论的虚拟蕴含原则的后果进行了实证检验。该原则指出，自然语言中的每个句子都暗含着自己的真理。采用这一原则意味着说谎者的句子不是矛盾的而是虚假的，因为它的内容与实际上暗示的内容相矛盾。结果，人类应该像其他假句子一样理解说谎者句子。这个骗子悖论的解决方案因对自然语言提出临时主张而受到批评。但是，由于心理生理学方面的现代进步，因此有可能进行实证研究，以研究人脑是否真的将说谎者句子理解为错误句子。我们设计并进行了一项实验，以检查大脑对真实句子，虚假句子和自我指称句子（包括说谎者和真相者）的反应。我们的结果为Buridan的假设提供了支持，并表明人脑对说谎者句子的处理与错误句子相同，而对Truthteller句子的理解与真实句子相同。这与从虚拟蕴含原理得出的预言相符，并支持人类以真理逻辑思考的想法，即真理是其适当语义的指定值的逻辑。我们的结果为Buridan的假设提供了支持，并表明人脑对说谎者句子的处理与错误句子相同，而对Truthteller句子的理解与真实句子相同。这与从虚拟蕴含原理得出的预言相符，并支持人类以真理逻辑思考的想法，即真理是其适当语义的指定值的逻辑。我们的结果为Buridan的假设提供了支持，并表明人脑对说谎者句子的处理与错误句子相同，而对Truthteller句子的理解与真实句子相同。这与从虚拟蕴含原理得出的预言相符，并支持人类以真理逻辑思考的想法，即真理是其适当语义的指定值的逻辑。
This article presents an empirical examination of the consequences of the virtual entailment principle proposed by Jean Buridan to resolve the Liar paradox. This principle states that every sentence in natural language implicitly asserts its own truth. Adopting this principle means that the Liar sentence is not paradoxical but false, because its content is contradictory to what is virtually implied. As a result, humans should perceive the Liar sentence the same way as any other false sentence. This solution to the Liar paradox received criticism for making ad hoc claims about the natural language. However, thanks to modern advancements in psychophysiology, it became possible to empirically investigate if the human brain really perceives the Liar sentence like a false sentence. We designed and conducted an experiment to examine brain activity in response to true sentences, false sentences and self-referential sentences (including the Liar and the Truthteller). Our results provide support for the Buridan’s hypothesis and show that the Liar sentence is processed by the human brain identically to false sentences, while the Truthteller sentence is perceived identically to true sentences. This agrees with predictions derived from the virtual entailment principle and supports the idea that humans think with the logic of truth—a logic for which the truth is a designated value of its adequate semantics.
