首先，史密斯所说的“非人化”一词和现象是什么意思？对于史密斯来说，当我们将他人视为“非人类生物”时，就会发生非人性化。
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这些生物可能是非人类动物，也可能是虚构的或超自然的生物，例如怪物或恶魔。非人性化是一种态度，发生在人们的头脑中。因此，史密斯给自己设定了一个相当大的挑战——确定人们真正的内在信念是什么，而不仅仅是他们在言语或行动中表达的东西（两者不一定完全或部分相关。人们可以并且确实表达，因为例如，他们并不真正赞同或相信的观点。）不仅如此——史密斯在承认这是一项艰巨的任务的同时，还认为有可能检测到“无症状”
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非人性化的形式——也就是说，“非人性化的态度被微妙和间接的暗示所背叛，而不是明确地体现在言语或行动中”。
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正如史密斯所说，“我相信，当人们将他人非人化时，他们确实将他们视为亚人，并且当这些非人化态度在言语中表达时，它们应该是字面上的描述性。”
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去人性化也不仅仅是归因于非人类特征，而是归因于非人类本质。史密斯著作的重要意义在于这一论点，因为根据史密斯的说法，像纳粹分子和白人至上主义者这样的人“在大多数情况下，过去和现在都是理智的人”。
9——
也就是说，他们的信仰不是病态的产物——那么他们怎么能把另一个人误认为是老鼠或害虫等等呢？
史密斯巧妙地挖掘出掩盖真正潜在态度的矛盾。例如，可以将某人描述为低人一等，但以仅与人类相关的方式对待他们。例如，非人性化的生物通常被认为对他们的行为负有道德责任，或者他们被羞辱。但是，害虫、虱子或其他用于使他人非人化的相关实体不能作为道德代理人承担责任，也不能羞辱他们。史密斯巧妙地揭示了种族本质主义等谬误，对史密斯来说，这是最“普遍、最根本和最具破坏性的”
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民间种族理论。此外，理解和揭穿种族本质主义对史密斯来说至关重要，因为它代表了被称为心理本质主义的更大心理倾向的具体表现，这也是非人化的心理学基础的相当一部分。简而言之，心理本质主义需要将本质归因于某些事物的倾向。正如史密斯所说，
[End Page 849]
生物学中的本质主义是值得怀疑的，当它归结到物种层面时，它与生物科学告诉我们的完全不符——然而，根据史密斯的说法，即使是那些清楚地意识到这一点的人这是一种没有科学证据支持的心理偏见，如果不小心，可能会滑入其思维定势。
简而言之，种族划分并不对应于真实的生物学类别。唯一存在的“变异”是在等位基因的水平上——也就是说，一个人的眼睛是蓝的，另一个人的眼睛是棕色的，这就构成了占有……
In lieu of
an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:
Reviewed by:
-
Making Monsters: The Uncanny Power of Dehumanization
by David Livingstone Smith
-
Dr. Linda Roland Danil (bio)
David Livingstone Smith,
Making Monsters: The Uncanny Power of Dehumanization
(Harvard University Press, 2021) ISBN: 9780674545564 (hardback), 352 pages.
In this book, David Livingstone Smith’s concern is how human beings can come to conceive of other human beings “as subhuman creatures”
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—a phenomenon that is not limited to a single culture or a specific, isolated historical period. Further, in this book, Smith seeks to rectify what he sees as a shortcoming in his earlier book—
Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others
.
2
The argument he offered in that
[End Page 848]
book, Smith feels, was both “incomplete and, in some respects, misleading.”
3
In that book, Smith’s thesis was that when one dehumanizes others, they are conceived as “
appearing
human when they are
really
subhuman.”
4
Smith is now unconvinced, however, and instead proposes that when we dehumanize others, we actually perceive them as
both
entirely human and entirely subhuman
simultaneously
.
To begin with, what does Smith mean by the term and phenomenon of “dehumanization”? For Smith, dehumanization occurs when we conceive of others as “subhuman creatures.”
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These creatures might be nonhuman animals, or they might be fictional or supernatural beings, such as monsters or demons. Dehumanization is an attitude and takes place inside people’s heads. Consequently, Smith sets himself a considerable challenge—to ascertain what it is that people truly, internally believe, rather than just what they express in speech or action (and the two need not necessarily entirely or partially correlate. People can and do express, for example, views that they do not genuinely subscribe to or believe in.) And not only that—Smith, while acknowledging that it is a tall order, also argues that it is possible to detect “asymptomatic”
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forms of dehumanization—that is to say, instances where “dehumanizing attitudes are betrayed by subtle and indirect cues rather than being explicitly embodied in speech or action.”
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As Smith argues, “I believe that when people dehumanize others, they really do conceive of them as subhumans, and that when these dehumanizing attitudes are expressed in speech, they are meant to be literally descriptive.”
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Dehumanization is also not just about attributing subhuman traits, but rather about attributing a subhuman essence. The import of Smith’s work lies in this argument, because, according to Smith, people like Nazis and white supremacists “were and are, for the most part, sane human beings.”
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—that is to say, their beliefs were not a product of pathology—so how could they mistake another human being for a rat, or vermin, amongst other things?
Smith skilfully unearths the contradictions that belie the true underlying attitude. For example, one can describe someone as subhuman but treat them in ways that are only relevant to human beings. Dehumanized beings are often held to be morally responsible for their actions, for example, or they are humiliated. However, vermin, or lice, or other related entities used to dehumanize others, cannot be held accountable as moral agents, and they cannot be humiliated. Smith deftly unpacks fallacies like racial essentialism, which, for Smith, is the most “prevalent, fundamental, and destructive”
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folk theory of race. Moreover, understanding and debunking racial essentialism is crucial for Smith, because it represents a specific manifestation of the larger psychological propensity known as psychological essentialism, which is also a considerable part of the psychological foundation for dehumanization. Succinctly, psychological essentialism entails the tendency to attribute essences to certain kinds of things. As Smith argues,
[End Page 849]
essentialism in biology is suspect, and when it comes down to the species level, it is simply inconsistent with what biological science tells us—and yet, according to Smith, even those who are clearly aware that it is a psychological bias with no scientific evidence to back it up can slip into its mindset if not careful.
To put it simply, racial divisions do not correspond to real, biological categories. The only “variations” that exist are at the level of alleles—that is to say, one person having blue eyes and another having brown constitutes being in possession...
